Friday, September 10, 2010

DEA document: Opium Growing and Heroin Manufacture

Opium - Poppy Cultivation, Morphine and Heroin Manufacture

Nature's antidepressant : Papaver somniferum

First of all, it seems like the information about opium cultivation and preparation and other chemistry came from a 1993 Department of Justice publication that was sponsored by DEA. 

That booklet is, I understand, out-of-print, and will not be reprinted. It is an amazing document because it essentially tells you all you really need to know about opium poppies, opium, and the basic procedures for extraction and conversion of morphine to heroin. 

I can also tell you that a USDA scientist named Mary Acock, was involved in the larger project that produced the book. It's my opinion that, had any of those government dudes thought about it for more than a few minutes, they never would have published it in the first place. It is simply too full of "dangerous" information. - Jim Hogshire 




Opium is the name for the latex produced within the seed pods of the opium poppy, Papaver somniferum. The plant is believed to have evolved from a wild strain, Papaver setigerum, which grows in coastal areas of the Mediterranean Sea. Through centuries of cultivation and breeding for opium, the speciessomniferum evolved. Today, P. somniferum is the only species of Papaver used to produce opium. Opium contains morphine, codeine, noscapine, papaverine, and thebaine. All but thebaine are used clinically as analgesics to reduce pain without a loss of consciousness. Thebaine is without analgesic effect but is of great pharmaceutical value due to its use in the production of semisynthetic opioid morphine analogues such as oxycodone (Percodan), dihydromorphenone (Dilaudid), and hydrocodone (Vicodin).

The psychological effects of opium may have been known to the ancient Sumerians (circa 4,000 B.C.) whose symbol for poppy was hul, "joy" and gil, "plant". The plant was known in Europe at least 4,000 years ago as evidenced by fossil remains of poppy seed cake and poppy pods found in the Neolithic Swiss Lake Dwellings. Opium was probably consumed by the ancient Egyptians and was known to the Greeks as well. Our word opium is derived from the Greek. The poppy is also referred to in Homer's works the Iliad and the Odyssey (850 B.C.). Hippocrates (460-357 B.C.) prescribed drinking the juice of the white poppy mixed with the seed of nettle.

The opium poppy probably reached China about the fourth century A.D. through Arab traders who advocated its use for medicinal purposes. In Chinese literature, there are earlier references to its use. The noted Chinese surgeon Hua To of the Three Kingdoms (220-264 A.D.) used opium preparations and Cannabis indica for his patients to swallow before undergoing major surgery.

The beginning of widespread opium use in China is associated with the introduction of tobacco smoking in pipes by Dutch from Java in the 17th century. The Chinese mixed Indian opium with the tobacco, two products that were being traded by the Dutch. This practice was adopted throughout the region and predictably resulted in increased opium smoking, both with and without tobacco.

By the late-1700s the British East India Company controlled the prime Indian poppy growing regions and dominated the Asian opium trade. By 1800, they had a monopoly on opium; controlling supply and setting prices.

In 1805, the German pharmacist Friedrich W. Serturner isolated and described the principal alkaloid and powerful active ingredient in opium. He named itmorphium after Morpheus, the Greek god of dreams. We know it today as morphine. This event was soon followed by the discovery of other alkaloids of opium: codeine in 1832 and papaverine in 1848. By the 1850s these pure alkaloids, rather than the earlier crude opium preparations, were being commonly prescribed for the relief of pain, cough, and diarrhea. This period also saw the invention and introduction of the hypodermic syringe.

By the late eighteenth century opium was being heavily used in China as a recreational drug. The Imperial court had banned its use and importation but large quantities were still being smuggled into China. In 1839 the Qing Emperor ordered his minister Lin Zexu to address the opium problem. Lin petitioned Queen Victoria for help but was ignored. In reaction, the emperor confiscated 20,000 barrels of opium and detained some foreign traders. The British retaliated by attacking the port city of Canton. Thus the First Opium War began. The Chinese were defeated and the Treaty of Nanjing was signed in 1842. The British required that the opium trade be allowed to continue, that the Chinese pay a large settlement, and that the Chinese cede Hongkong to the British Empire. The Second Opium War began and ended in 1856 over western demands that opium markets be expanded. The Chinese were again defeated and opium importation to China was legalized.

In the United States during the 19th century, opium preparations and 'patent medicines' containing opium extract such as paregoric (camphorated tincture of opium) and laudanum (deodorized opium tincture) became widely available and quite popular. In the 1860s morphine was used extensively pre- and post-operatively as a painkiller for wounded soldiers during the Civil War. Civil War physicians frequently dispensed opiates. In 1866 the Secretary of War stated that during the war the Union Army was issued 10 million opium pills, over 2,840,000 ounces of other opiate preparations (such as laudanum or paregoric), and almost 30,000 ounces of morphine sulphate. The inevitable result was opium addiction, called the 'army disease' or the 'soldier's disease.' These opium and morphine addiction problems prompted a scientific search for potent but nonaddictive painkillers. In the 1870s, chemists synthesized a supposedly non-addictive, substitute for morphine by acetylating morphine. In 1898 the Bayer pharmaceutical company of Germany was the first to make available this new drug, 3,6-diacetylmorphine, in large quantities under the trademarked brand name Heroin. 3,6-diacetylmorphine is two to three times more potent than morphine. Most of the increase is due to its increased lipid solubility, which provides enhanced and rapid central nervous system penetration.

Heroin was initially used with much success as a superior cough suppressant for patients with (then incurable) tuberculosis. Tuberculosis patients continued to die, but without the tortuous coughing and pain. A second use of heroin was to combat morphine addiction - just as morphine was originally used to combat opium addiction. Soon after its introduction, however, Heroin was recognized as having narcotic and addictive properties far exceeding those of morphine.

In December 1914, the United States Congress passed the Harrison Narcotics Act which called for control of each phase of the preparation and distribution of medicinal opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine, and any new derivative that could be shown to have similar properties. It made illegal the possession of these controlled substances. The restrictions in the Harrison Act were most recently redefined by the Federal Controlled Substances Act of 1970. The Act lists as a Schedule II Controlled Substance opium and its derivatives and all parts of the P. somniferum plant except the seed.

The first period of large scale heroin smuggling into the United States since its prohibition occurred during the years 1967 through 1971. Turkish opium was processed into heroin in France and then smuggled into New York.

In the mid-1970s Mexican brown heroin appeared. It was sold at a lower price than European heroin and became readily available in the West and Midwest. By the mid-1980s the U.S. heroin market was being supplied from three regions: Mexico, Southwest Asia (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkey, Lebanon), and Southeast Asia (Burma, Laos, Thailand). Soon thereafter, South American heroin from Columbia appeared.

In 1997, Southeast Asia still accounts for well over half of the world's opium production. It is estimated that the region has the capacity to produce over 200 metric tons of heroin annually. Although much of it is consumed in Asia, thousands of kilograms of Southeast Asian heroin enter the United States each year.

The chemical structure of opiates is very similar to that of naturally produced compounds called endorphins and enkephalins. These compounds are derived from an amino acid pituitary hormone called beta-lipotropin which when released is cleaved to form met-enkephalin, gamma-endorphin, and beta-endorphin. Opiate molecules, due to their similar structure, engage many of the endorphins' nerve-receptor sites in the brain's pleasure centers and bring about similar analgesic effects. In the human body, a pain stimulus usually exites an immediate protective reaction followed by the release of endorphins to relieve discomfort and reward the mental learning process. Opiates mimic high levels of endorphins to produce intense euphoria and a heightened state of well-being. Regular use results in increased tolerance and the need for greater quantities of the drug. Profound physical and psychological dependence results from regular use and rapid cessation brings about withdrawal sickness.

In addition to the pleasure/pain centers, there is also a concentration of opiate receptors in the respiratory center of the brain. Opiates have an inhibiting effect on these cells and in the case of an overdose, respiration can come to a complete halt. Opiates also inhibit sensitivity to the impulse to cough.

A third location for these receptors is in the brain's vomiting center. Opiate use causes nausea and vomiting. Tolerance for this effect is built up very quickly. Opiates effect the digestive system by inhibiting intestinal peristalsis. Long before they were used as painkillers, opiates were used to control diarrhea.

The opium poppy, Papaver somniferum, is an annual plant. From a very small round seed, it grows, flowers, and bears fruit (seed pods) only once. The entire growth cycle for most varieties of this plant takes about 120 days. The seeds of P. somniferumcan be distinguished from other species by the appearance of a fine secondary fishnet reticulation within the spaces of the coarse reticulation found all over their surface. When compared with otherPapaver species, P. somniferum plants will have their leaves arranged along the stem of the plant, rather than basal leaves, and the leaves and stem will be 'glabrous' (hairless). The tiny seeds germinate quickly, given warmth and sufficient moisture. Sprouts appear in fourteen to twenty-one days. In less than six weeks the young plant has grown four large leaves and resembles a small cabbage in appearance. The lobed, dentate leaves are glaucous green with a dull gray or blue tint.

Within sixty days, the plant will grow from one to two feet in height, with one primary, long, smooth stem. The upper portion of this stem is without leaves and is the 'peduncle'. One or more secondary stems, called 'tillers', may grow from the main stem of the plant. Single poppy plants in Southeast Asia often have one or more tillers.

As the plant grows tall, the main stem and each tiller terminates in a flower bud. During the development of the bud, the peduncle portion of the stem elongates and forms a distinctive 'hook' which causes the bud to be turned upside down. As the flower develops, the peduncle straightens and the buds point upward. A day or two after the buds first point upward, the two outer segments of the bud, called 'sepals,' fall away, exposing the flower petals.

Opium poppies generally flower after about ninety days of growth and continue to flower for two to three weeks. The exposed flower blossom is at first crushed and crinkled, but the petals soon expand and become smooth in the sun. Opium poppy flowers have four petals. The petals may be single or double and may be white, pink, reddish purple, crimson red, or variegated. The petals last for two to four days and then drop to reveal a small, round, green fruit which continues to develop. These fruits or pods (also called 'seedpods', 'capsules,' 'bulbs,' or 'poppy heads') are either oblate, elongated, or globular and mature to about the size of a chicken egg. The oblate-shaped pods are more common in Southeast Asia.

The main stem of a fully-matured P. somniferum plant can range between two to five feet in height. The green leaves are oblong, toothed and lobed and are between four to fifteen inches in diameter at maturity. The mature leaves have no commercial value except for use as animal fodder.

Only the pod portion of the plant can produce opium alkaloids. The skin of the poppy pod encloses the wall of the pod ovary. The ovary wall consists of an outer, middle, and inner layer. The plant's latex (opium) is produced within the ovary wall and drains into the middle layer through a system of vessels and tubes within the pod. The cells of the middle layer secrete more than 95 percent of the opium when the pod is scored and harvested.

Cultivators in Mainland Southeast Asia tap the opium from each pod while it remains on the plant. After the opium is scraped, the pods are cut from the stem and allowed to dry. Once dry, the pods are cut open and the seeds are removed and dried in the sun before storing for the following year's planting. An alternative method of collecting planting seeds is to collect them from intentionally unscored pods, because scoring may diminish the quality of the seeds. Aside from being used as planting seed, the poppy seeds may also be used in cooking and in the manufacture of paints and perfumes. Poppy seed oil is straw-yellow in color, odorless, and has a pleasant, almond-like taste. The opium poppy grows best in temperate, warm climates with low humidity. It requires only a moderate amount of water before and during the early stages of growth. In addition, it is a 'long day' photo-responsive plant. As such, it requires long days and short nights before it will develop flowers. The opium poppy plant can be grown in a variety of soils; clay, sandy loam, sandy, and sandy clay, but it responds best to sandy loam soil. This type of soil has good moisture-retentive and nutrient-retentive properties, is easily cultivated, and has a favorable structure for root development. Clay soil types are hard and difficult to pulverize into a good soil texture. The roots of a young poppy plant cannot readily penetrate clay soils, and growth is inhibited. Sandy soil, by contrast, does not retain sufficient water or nutrients for proper growth of the plant.

Excessive moisture or extremely arid conditions will adversely affect the poppy plant's growth and reduce the alkaloid content. Poppy plants can become waterlogged and die after a heavy rainfall in poorly drained soil. Heavy rainfall in the second and third months of growth can leach alkaloids from the plant and spoil the opium harvest. Dull, rainy, or cloudy weather during this critical growth period may reduce both the quantity and the quality of the alkaloid content.

Opium poppies were widely grown as an ornamental plant and for seeds in the United States until the possession of this plant was declared illegal in the Opium Poppy Control Act of 1942. New generations of plants from the self-sown seed of these original poppies can still be seen in many old ornamental gardens.

The major legal opium poppy growing areas in the world today are in govemment-regulated opium farms in lndia, Turkey and Tasmania, Australia. The major illegal growing areas are in the highlands of Mainland Southeast Asia, specifically Burma (Myanmar), Laos, and Thailand, as well as the adjacent areas of southern China and northwestern Vietnam. The area is known as the 'Golden Triangle'. In Southwest Asia, opium poppies are grown in Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan. Opium poppy is also grown in Lebanon, Guatemala, Colombia and Mexico.

The highlands of Mainland Southeast Asia, at elevations of 800 meters or more above sea level, are prime poppy growing areas. Generally speaking, these poppy-farming areas do not require irrigation, fertilizer, or insecticides for successful opium yields.

Most of the opium poppies of Southeast Asia are grown in Burma (Myamnar), specifically in the Wa and Kokang areas which are in the northeastern quadrant of the Shan State of Burma. Laos is the second-largest illicit opium-producing country in Southeast Asia and third-largest in the world.

In Laos, poppy is cultivated extensively in Houaphan and Xiangkhoang Provinces, as well as the six other northern provinces: Bokeo, Louangnamtha, Louangphabang, Oudomxai, Phongsali and Xaignabouli. Poppy is also grown in many of the remote, mountainous areas of northern Thailand, particularly in Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai, Mae Hong Son, Nan and Tak Provinces.

In China, opium poppies are cultivated by ethnic minority groups in the mountainous frontier regions of Yunnan Province, particularly along the border area with Burma's Kachin and Shan States. Son La Province, situated between China and Laos, is a major opium poppy cultivation area in Vietnam, as are Lai Chau and Nghe An Provinces.

It is noteworthy that the dominant ethnic groups of Mainland Southeast Asia are not poppy cultivators. The Burmans and Shan of Burma, the Lao of Laos, the Thai of Thailand, the Han Chinese of Yunnan, China, and the Vietnamese of Vietnam are lowlanders and do not traditionally cultivate opium poppies. Rather, it is the ethnic minority highlander groups, such as the Wa, Pa-0, Palaung, Lahu, Lisu, Hmong, and Akha who grow poppies in the highlands of the countries of Southeast Asia.

A typical nuclear family of Mainland Southeast Asian highlanders ranges between five and ten persons, including two to five adults. An average household of poppy farmers can cultivate and harvest about one acre of opium poppy per year. Most of the better fields can support opium poppy cultivation for ten years or more without fertilization, irrigation, or insecticides, before the soil is depleted and new fields must be cleared. In choosing a field to grow opium poppy, soil quality and acidity are critical factors and experienced poppy farmers choose their fields carefully. In Southeast Asia, westerly orientations are typically preferred to optimize sun exposure. Most fields are on mountain slopes at elevations of 1,000 meters (3,000 feet) or more above sea level. Slope gradients of 20 degrees to 40 degrees are considered best for drainage of rain water.

In Mainland Southeast Asia, virgin land is prepared by cutting and piling all brush, vines and small trees in the field during March, at the end of the dry season. After allowing the brush to dry in the hot sun for several days, the field is set afire. This method, called 'slash-and burn' or 'swidden' agriculture, is commonly practiced by dry field farmers - both highland and lowland - throughout Mainland Southeast Asia in order to ready the land for a variety of field crops. The slash-and-burn method is also used to clear fields for poppy cultivation. Before the rainy season in April, fields by the hundreds of thousands all over the region are set ablaze. A fog-like yellow haze hangs over the area for weeks, reducing visibility for hundreds of miles. In the mountains, the dense haze blocks out the sun and stings the eyes.

A typical highlander family will plant an area of two or three rai in opium poppy (2.53 rai is equivalent to one acre). In August or September, toward the end of the rainy season, highland farmers in Southeast Asia prepare fields selected for opium poppy planting. By this time, the ash resulting from the burn-off of the previous dry season has settled into the soil, providing additional nutrients, especially potash. The soil is turned with long-handled hoes after it is softened by the rains. The farmers then break up the large clumps of soil. Weeds and stones are tossed aside and the ground is leveled off.

Traditionally, most highland and upland farmers in Southeast Asia do not use fertilizer for any of their crops, including the opium poppy, but in recent years opium poppy farmers have started using both natural and chemical fertilizers to increase opium poppy yields. Chicken manure, human feces or the regions' abundant bat droppings are often mixed into the planting soil before the opium poppy seed is planted.

The planting must be completed by the end of October in order to take advantage of the region's 'long days' in November and December.

The opium poppy seed can be sown several ways: broadcast (tossed by hand); or fix-dropped by hand into shallow holes dug with a metal-tipped dibble stick. About one pound of opium poppy seed is needed to sow one acre of land. The seeds may be white, yellow, coffee-color, gray, black, or blue. Seed color is not related to the color of the flower petals. Beans, cabbages, cotton, parsley, spinach, squash and tobacco are crops typically planted with the opium poppy. These crops neither help nor hinder the cultivation of the opium poppy, but are planted for personal consumption or as a cash crop.

In the highlands of Southeast Asia, it is a common practice to plant maize and opium poppies in the same fields each year. The maize keeps down excessive weeds and provides feed for the farmer's pigs and ponies. It is grown from April to August. After harvesting the maize, and with the stalks still standing in the fields, the ground is weeded and pulverized. Just before the end of the rainy season, in successive sowings throughout September and October, the poppy seed is broadcast among the maize stalks. These stalks can protect young opium poppy plants from heavy rains.

The opium poppy plants form leaves in the first growth stage, called the 'cabbage' or 'lettuce' stage. After a month of growth, when the opium poppy is about a foot high, some of the plants are removed (called 'thinning') to allow the other plants more room to grow. The ideal spacing between plants is believed to be 20 to 40 centimeters, or about eight to twelve plants per square meter, although some researchers in northern Thailand have reported as many as 18 plants per square meter.

During the first two months, the opium poppies may be damaged or stunted by nature through the lack of adequate sunshine, excessive rainfall, insects, worms, hail storms, early frost, or trampling by animals. The third month of growth does not require as much care as the first two months. Three to four months after planting, from late December to early February, the opium poppies are in full bloom. Mature plants range between three to five feet in height. Most opium poppy varieties in Southeast Asia produce three to five mature pods per plant. A typical opium poppy field has 60,000 to 120,000 poppy plants per hectare, with a range of 120,000 to 275,000 opium-producing pods. The actual opium yield will depend largely on weather conditions and the precautions taken by individual farmers to safeguard the crop. The farmer and his family generally move into the field for the final two weeks, setting up a small field hut on the edge of the opium poppy field.

The scoring of the pods (also called 'lancing,' 'incising,' or 'tapping') begins about two weeks after the flower petals fall from the pods. The farmer examines the pod and the tiny crown portion on the top of the pod very carefully before scoring.

The grayish-green pod will become a dark green color as it matures and it will swell in size. If the points of the pod's crown are standing straight out or are curved upward, the pod is ready to be scored. If the crown's points turn downward, the pod is not yet fully matured. Not all the plants in a field will be ready for scoring at the same time and each pod can be tapped more than once.

A set of three or four small blades of iron, glass, or glass splinters bound tightly together on a wooden handle is used to score two or three sides of the pod in a vertical direction. If the blades cut too deep into the wall of the pod, the opium will flow too quickly and will drip to the ground. If the incisions are too shallow, the flow will be too slow and the opium will harden in the pods. A depth of about one millimeter is desired for the incision.

Using a blade-tool designed to cut to that depth, scoring ideally starts in late afternoon so the white raw opium latex can ooze out and slowly coagulate on the surface of the pod overnight. If the scoring begins too early in the afternoon, the sun will cause the opium to coagulate over the incision and block the flow. Raw opium oxidizes, darkens and thickens in the cool night air. Early the next morning, the opium gum is scraped from the surface of the pods with a short-handled, flat, iron blade three to four inches wide.

Opium harvesters work their way backwards across the field scoring the lower, mature pods before the taller pods, in order to avoid brushing up against the sticky pods. The pods continue to produce opium for several days. Farmers will return to these plants - sometimes up to five or six times - to gather additional opium until the pod is totally depleted. The opium is collected in a container which hangs from the farmer's neck or waist.

The opium yield from a single pod varies greatly, ranging from 10 to 100 milligrams of opium per pod. The average yield per pod is about 80 milligrams. The dried opium weight yield per hectare of poppies ranges from eight to fifteen kilograms.

As the farmers gather the opium, they will commonly tag the larger or more productive pods with colored string or yarn. These pods will later be cut from their stems, cut open, dried in the sun and their seeds used for the following year's planting.

The wet opium gum collected from the pods contains a relatively high percentage of water and needs to be dried for several days. High-quality raw opium will be brown (rather than black) in color and will retain its sticky texture. Experienced opium traders can quickly determine if the opium has been adulterated with tree sap, sand, or other such materials. Raw opium in Burma, Laos and Thailand is usually sun-dried, weighed in a standard 1.6 kilogram quantity (called a 'viss' in Burma; a 'choi' in Laos and Thailand), wrapped in banana leaf or plastic and then stored until ready to sell, trade, or smoke. While opium smoking is common among most adult opium poppy farmers, heavy addiction is generally limited to the older, male farmers. The average yearly consumption of cooked opium per smoker is estimated to be 1.6 kilograms.

A typical opium poppy farmer household in Southeast Asia will collect 2 to 5 choi or viss (3 to 9 kilograms) of opium from a year's harvest of a one-acre field. That opium will be dried, wrapped and stacked on a shelf by February or March. If the opium has been properly dried, it can be stored indefinitely. Excessive moisture and heat can cause the opium to deteriorate but, once dried, opium is relatively stable. In fact, as opium dries and becomes less pliable, its value increases due to the decrease in water weight per kilogram.

Before opium is smoked, it is usually 'cooked'. Uncooked opium contains moisture, as well as soil, leaves, twigs, and other impurities which diminish the quality of the final product. The raw opium collected from the opium poppy pods is placed in an open cooking pot of boiling water where the sticky globs of opium alkaloids quickly dissolve. Soil, twigs, plant scrapings, etc., remain undissolved. The solution is then strained through cheesecloth to remove these impurities. The clear brown liquid that remains is opium in solution, sometimes called 'liquid opium'. This liquid is then re-heated over a low flame until the water is driven off into the air as steam leaving a thick dark brown paste. This paste is called 'prepared', 'cooked', or 'smoking' opium. It is dried in the sun until it has a putty-like consistency. The net weight of the cooked opium is generally only eighty percent that of the original raw opium. Thus, cooked opium is more pure than its original, raw form, and has a higher monetary value.

Cooked opium is suitable for smoking or eating by opium users. Traditionally there is only one group of opium poppy farmers, the Hmong, who prefer not to cook their opium before smoking. Most other ethnic groups, including Chinese opium addicts, prefer smoking cooked opium. If the opium is to be sold to traders for use in morphine or heroin laboratories, it is not necessary to cook it first. The laboratory operators generally use 55-gallon oil drums or huge cooking vats to dissolve the raw opium before beginning the morphine extraction process.

Raw or cooked opium contains more than thirty-five different alkaloids, including morphine, which accounts for approximately ten percent of the total raw opium weight. Heroin manufacturers must first extract the morphine from the opium before converting the morphine to heroin. The extraction is a simple process, requiring only a few chemicals and a supply of water. Since the morphine base is about one-tenth the weight and volume of raw opium, it is desirable to reduce the opium to morphine before transporting the product any great distance. Morphine is sometimes extracted from opium in small clandestine 'laboratories' which may be set up near the opium poppy fields.

The process of extracting morphine from opium involves dissolving opium in hot water, adding lime to precipitate the non-morphine alkaloids and then adding ammonium chloride to precipitate the morphine from the solution. An empty oil drum and some cooking pots are all that is needed.

The following is a step-by-step description of morphine extraction in a typical Southeast Asian laboratory:

  1. An empty 55-gallon oil drum is placed on bricks about a foot above the ground and a fire is built under the drum. Thirty gallons of water are added to the drum and brought to a boil. Ten to fifteen kilograms of raw opium are added to the boiling water.

  2. With stirring, the raw opium eventually dissolves in the boiling water, while soil, leaves, twigs, and other non-soluble materials float in the solution. Most of these materials are scooped out of the clear brown 'liquid opium' solution.

  3. Slaked lime (calcium hydroxide), or more often a readily available chemical fertilizer with a high content of lime, is added to the solution. The lime converts the water insoluble morphine into the water soluble calcium morphenate. The other opium alkaloids do not react with the lime to form soluble calcium salts. Codeine is slightly water soluble and gets carried over with the calcium morphenate in the liquid. For the most part, the other alkaloids become part of the residual sediment 'sludge' that comes to rest on the bottom of the oil drum.

  4. As the solution cools, and after the insolubles precipitate out, the morphine solution is scooped from the drum and poured through a filter of some kind. Burlap rice sacks are often used as filters. They are later squeezed in a press to remove most of the solution from the wet sacks. The solution is then poured into large cooking pots and re-heated, but not boiled.

  5. Ammonium chloride is added to the heated calcium morphenate solution to adjust the alkalinity to a pH of 8 to 9, and the solution is then allowed to cool. Within one or two hours, the morphine base and the unextracted codeine base precipitate out of the solution and settle to the bottom of the cooking pot.

  6. The solution is then poured off through cloth filters. Any solid morphine base chunks in the solution will remain on the cloth. The morphine base is removed from both the cooking pot and from the filter cloths, wrapped and squeezed in cloth, and then dried in the sun. When dry, the crude morphine base is a coffee-colored powder.

  7. This 'crude' morphine base, commonly known by the Chinese term p'i-tzu throughout Southeast Asia, may be further purified by dissolving it in hydrochloric acid, adding activated charcoal, re-heating and re-filtering. The solution is filtered several more times, and the morphine (morphine hydrochloride) is then dried in the sun.

  8. Morphine hydrochloride (still tainted with codeine hydrochloride) is usually formed into small brick-sized blocks in a press and wrapped in paper or cloth. The most common block size is 2 inches by 4 inches by 5 inches weighing about 1.3 kilograms (3 lbs). The bricks are then dried for transport to heroin processing laboratories.

Approximately 13 kilograms of opium, from one hectare of opium poppies, are needed to produce each morphine block of this size. The morphine blocks are bundled and packed for transport to heroin laboratories by human couriers or by pack animals. Pack mules are able to carry 100-kilogram payloads over 200 miles of rugged mountain trails in less than three weeks.

The conversion of morphine hydrochloride to heroin base is a relatively simple and inexpensive procedure. The necessary chemicals are readily available industrial chemicals. The equipment is very basic and quite portable. Heroin conversion laboratories are generally located in isolated, rural areas due to the telltale odors of the lab's chemicals. Acetic anhydride, in particular, is a key chemical with the easily identified very pungent odor of pickles.

Heroin synthesis is a two-step process which generally requires twelve to fourteen hours to complete. Heroin base is the intermediate product. Typically, morphine hydrochloride bricks are pulverized and the dried powder is then placed in an enamel or stainless steel rice cooking pot. The liquid acetic anhydride is then added. The pot lid is tied or clamped on, with a damp towel used for a gasket. The pot is carefully heated for about two hours, below boiling, at a constant temperature of 185 degrees Fahrenheit. It is never allowed to boil or to become so hot as to vent fumes. It is agitated by tilting and swirling until all of the morphine has dissolved. Acetic anhydride reacts with the morphine to form diacetylmorphine (heroin). This acetylation process will work either with morphine hydrochloride or p'i-tzu(crude morphine base).

When cooking is completed, the pot is cooled and opened. The morphine and the acetic anhydride have now become chemically bonded, creating an impure form of diacetylmorphine (heroin). Water is added at three times the volume of acetic anhydride and the mixture is stirred. Activated charcoal is added and mixed by stirring and the mixture is then filtered to remove colored impurities. Solids remaining on the filter are discarded. Sodium carbonate, used at 2.5 pounds per pound of morphine, is dissolved in hot water and added slowly to the liquid until effervescence stops. This precipitates the heroin base which is then filtered and dried by heating in a steam bath for an hour. For each pound of morphine, about 11 ounces of crude heroin base is formed. The heroin base may be dried, packed and transported to a heroin refining laboratory or it may be purified further and/or converted to heroin hydrochloride, a water-soluble salt form of heroin, at the same site.

Southeast Asian heroin base is an intermediate product which can be further converted to either a smoking form (Heroin No. 3) or an injectable form (Heroin No. 4).


(Smoking Heroin, heroin hydrochloride)

To make heroin No. 3, the crude base is mixed with hydrochloric acid resulting in heroin hydrochloride. Adulterants including caffeine are added after this conversion. For each kilogram of crude heroin base about one kilogram of caffeine is used. Various 'flavorings' such as quinine hydrochloride or strychnine hydrochloride may be added in 7 gram or 14 gram increments. Next, the wet paste mix is stirred to dryness over the steam bath. The resulting dry Heroin No. 3 will be in the form of coarse lumps. These are crushed and passed through a #8 to #10 mesh sieve, and the grains (pieces) are then packaged for sale. The entire process takes about eight hours and requires only minimal skill. While extra attention to stirring is required to assure dryness, one man can prepare a one-kilogram block of Heroin No. 3 during this time.


(Injectable Heroin)

To the heroin base mixture in the pot, water is added at three times the volume of acetic anydride and mixed by stirring. A small amount of chloroform is added. The mixture is stirred and then allowed to stand for twenty minutes. Doing so precipitates highly-colored impurities and a red, greasy liquid. The water layer is carefully poured off and saved in a clean pot, leaving the red grease in the pot. In a clean pot, activated charcoal is stirred into the aqueous solution and is filtered to remove solid impurities. The decolorizing effects of the charcoal, combined with the chloroform treatment, will leave a light yellow solution. The use of charcoal is repeated one or more times, until the solution is colorless.

Approximately 1.1 kilograms of sodium carbonate per 0.5 kilogram of morphine is dissolved in hot water and added slowly to the mixture until the effervescence stops. This precipitates the heroin base which is then filtered and dried by heating on a steam bath. The heroin base is heated until dryness is complete, an imperative for the preparation of Heroin No.4. The powder should be very white at this stage. If not white, the base is redissolved in diluted acid, treated repeatedly with activated charcoal, reprecipitated and dried. The ultimate purity and color of the resulting heroin hydrochloride depends largely on the quality of the heroin base.

The following optional steps are sometimes taken by skilled heroin chemists to increase quality.

For each pound of heroin base 1,100 milliliters of ethyl alcohol is heated to boiling. The heroin base is added and stirred until completely dissolved. The heated solution is then quickly filtered through a Büchner funnel that has been preheated and poured into a heated flask. This hot filtration removes the traces of sodium carbonate that remained in the base. The solution is quickly cooled in an ice bath, where it becomes very thick; like ice cream. The substance is put into a pan and set in a large refrigerator. A fan is set to blow across the pan to cause slow evaporation of the alcohol while the paste crystallizes. After several hours, it is vacuum-filtered. The filtrate, pure ethyl alcohol, is re-used. The solid material, 'alcohol morphine base', is actually recrystallized heroin base.

The heroin product, either heroin base or recrystallized heroin base, is weighed. For each pound of solid product, 3,000 milliliters of ethyl alcohol, 3,000 milliliters of ether, and 102 milliliters of concentrated hydrochloric acid are measured out. The solid is dissolved by heating with one-third of the alcohol and one-half of the acid. Another one-third of the acid is added and mixed by stirring. Next, acid is added slowly, drop by drop, until the product is completely converted to the hydrochloride. Two methods of testing this end product may be used. Either a drop of solution evaporates on a clean glass plate, leaving no trace of cloudiness in the residue, or a drop of the solution placed on Congo red paper causes the paper to turn blue.

Once the acid is added, the remaining alcohol is stirred in. Half of the ether is then added with stirring and the mixture is allowed to stand for fifteen minutes. It must be examined with great care since it is extremely volatile and flammable. Once the first small crystals are detected, the remaining ether is added at once. The vessel is stirred, covered and allowed to stand for twenty minutes to one hour. The mixture becomes nearly solid after an hour. At this point, it is filtered and the solids are collected on clean filter paper. The paper is wrapped around the crystals and placed on wooden trays, usually over lime rock, to dry. When the crystals of pure heroin hydrochloride are dry, they are packaged. Batches of 5 to 10 kilograms are commonly made at one time, the largest batch being an estimated 20 kilograms.

Chemicals used to isolate morphine from opium include ammonium chloride, calcium carbonate (limestone), and calcium hydroxide (slaked lime). The precursor chemical normally used in the conversion of morphine to heroin is acetic anhydride. Chemical reagents used in the conversion process include sodium carbonate and activated charcoal. Chemical solvents needed are chloroform, ethyl alcohol (ethanol), ethyl ether and acetone. Other chemicals may be substituted for these preferred chemicals, but most or all of these preferred chemicals are readily available through smugglers and suppliers.

Necessary laboratory equipment includes measuring cups, funnels, filter paper, litmus paper and a stainless steel pot. Only the most sophisticated heroin labs use glass flasks, propane gas ovens, Bunsen burners, vacuum pumps, autoclaves, electric blenders, venting hoods, centrifuges, reflux condensers, electric drying ovens and elaborate exhaust systems. Portable, gasoline-powered generators are often used at clandestine heroin conversion laboratories used to power various electrical devices.


Corrections to the text by Jim Hogshire:

Common Misconception Numero Uno appears in Pakker's history of opium. It is the dreaded "soldier's disease"...

He says:

In the 1860s morphine was used extensively pre- and post-operatively as a painkiller for wounded soldiers during the Civil War...The inevitable result was opium addiction, called the 'army disease' or the 'soldier's disease'.

This is an example of anti-drug propaganda which sounds so damned possible few ever question it. And it has worked well for the Drug Warriors from the beginning, which was just a few years before the Harrison act was passed. In fact, this yarn was invented to portray opium and morphine as so powerful and so addicting that it could take over the soul of anyone, even against their will.

But on Cliff Schaeffer's Site there is an essay about "soldier's disease" that does question the story and, lo and behold, it's not true!

No doubt, opium was used very extensively in during the Civil War, and before and after it, too. But there is just no documentation of any mass addiction and the phrase "soldier's disease" or its variants didn't appear for something like 40 years after the war.

I think the essay is called "The Mythical Roots of US drug policy."

Another slight error I think is worth correcting is what Pakker says about the Harrison Act:

"In December 1914, the United States Congress passed the Harrison Narcotics Act which called for control of each phase of the preparation and distribution of medicinal opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine, and any new derivative that could be shown to have similar properties. It made illegal the possession of these controlled substances."

The Harrison Act wasn't that bad. It did not outlaw heroin, for instance. That didn't happen until 1923. And it didn't make possession of opium, opiates or cocaine illegal but pretended to be a tax measure only. The first time it was challenged, in 1916, the Supreme Court knocked it down in a 7-3 vote. Writing for the majority Justice O.W. Holmes acted outraged that the government would try to make criminals out of the majority of American citizens who all had some form of opium in their homes. If Congess were trying to legislate morals by this law with its "coating of constitutionality" coming from its supposed power to tax, they had another think coming.

What's kind of scarey is that in 1919, the Supreme court heard two other cases in which the law was upheld. Between 1916 and 1919 some of the judges had changed but it still wouldn't account for the 5-4 vote in favor of the government and (very strangely) overturning its own opinion so quickly -- something the Supremes just hate to do.

But, looking at the rosters it becomes apparent that Holmes changed his mind. I have still not completely verified this, but it sure looks like it. I can't figure out why in the hell he would do this, though.

As for the part about "any new derivative" with similar properties, etc. is also not correct. That really didn't happen until 1986 with the Analog Substances Act.

Earlier versions of the "Harrison Act" outlawed caffeine, too. So I guess we can count ourselves lucky.

Btw, the poppy plant itself was outlawed in 1943 by the "Poppy Control Act" and then it was "repealed" in 1972 when the congress jerks realized the new Controlled Substances Act was sufficient to make them illegal.

And Pakker is right about what's illegal. Papaver somniferum is illegal. Every pat of the plant is illegal *except the seeds*. As soon as the seed sprouts, it seems to me, the thing is illegal.

Do not, repeat, do not, believe in Harper's author and human jackal Michael Pollan's carefully constructed "innocent gardene" defense because it will not work in front of a real-life judge. With all drugs, "mens rea" or "bad intent" is supposed.

OK, I gotta go now. Till later,

Jim 



bin Laden's Sudanese construction wires Dallas Bank of America

 

During World War II, OSS officers working to oust the Japanese from Southeast Asia develped a cordial relationship with Ho Chi Minh, finding that the Viet Minh leader spoke fluent English and was well versed in American history.  Ho quoted from memory lengthy passages from the that Vietnamee nationalists had been asking American presidents, since forces in China, the OSS opperatives in Vietnam realized that Ho's well trained troops were a vital ally, more capable and less corrupt than China.  When Ho was stricken wiith malaria, the OSS sent one of its agents, Paul Helliwell, who would later head up the CIA's Overseas Supply Company, to treat the ailing Communist.  Similar tp Joe Stilwell's view of Mao, many military and OSS men recommended that the US should back Ho after the eviction of the Japanese.

After arriving in Vietnam in 1945, US Army General Phillip Gallagher asked the OSS to compile a detailed background on Ho.  An OSS operative named Le Xuan, who would later work for the CIA during the Vietnam War, acquired a dossier on Ho from a disaffected Vietnamese nationalist: Le Xuan paid the man off with a bag of opium.  The dossier disclosed to US intelligence agencies that Ho had had extended stays in the Soviet Union, a revelation ahat doomed any duture aid from the Americans for his case.  Le Xuan would later turn on the CIA, showing up in Paris in 1968 to reveal his services to the Agency and denounce its murderous policies in Vietnam.

In 1953, Tinquier's Operation X opium nework was discovered byColonel Edwin Lansdale, at the time the CIA's military adviser in Southeast Asia.  Lansdale later claimed that he protested about this French role in opium trafficking, but was admonished to hold his tongue because, in his words, exposure of "the operation would prove a major embarrassment to a friendlly government."  In fact, the CIA's military adviser in Southeast Asia.  Lansdale later claimed that he protested about this French role in opium trafficking, but was admonished to hold his tongue because, in his words, exposure of "the operation would prove a major embarrassment to a friendly government."  In fact, the CIA's director, Allen Dulles, was mightily impressed by Trinquier's operation and, looking ahead to the time when the US would take over from the French in the region, began funneling money, guns and CIA advisers to Trinquier's Hmong army.

The Post-Dien Bien Pu accords, signed in Geneva in 1954, decreeded that Laos was to be neutral, off-limits to all foreign miltary forces.  This had te effect of opening Laos to the CIA, which did not consider itself a military force.  The CIA became the unchallenged principal in all US actions inside Laos.  Once in this position of dominace the CIA brooked no interference from the Pentagon.  This point was driven home by the military attache to Laos, Colonel Paul Pettigrew, who advised his replacement in Vientiane in 1961, "for God's sake, don't buck the CIA or you'll find yourself floating face down on that Mekong River."

From the moment the Geneva Accords were signed, the US government was determined to undermine them and do evertying in its power to prevent the installation of Ho Chi Minh as president of all Vietnam, most Vietnamese, as President Dwight D. Eisenhower famously admitted.  Eisenhower and his advisers decreed that Lao's neutral statusshould be subverted.  On the ground this meant that the neutralist government of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma, which had amicable relferred client was General Nosavan Phoumi.  The Agency fixed elections in 1960 in an attempt to legitmize his rule.  Also in 1960 the CIA began a more sustained effort to build up Vang Pao and his army, furnishing him with rifles, morars, rockets and grenades.

After John Kennedy's victory in 1960, Eisenhower advised him that the next big battleground in Southeast Asia would not be Vietnam but Laos.  His counsel found its mark, even though Kennedy initially snooted Laos as "a country not worthy of engaging the attention of great powers."  In public Kennedy pronounced the country's name as L-A-Y-O-S,  thinking that Americans would not rally to the cause of a place pronounced "louse."  In 1960 there were but a thousand men in Vang Pao's army.  By 1961 "L'Armee Clandestine" had grown to 9,000.  By the time of Kennedy's assassination in late 1963, Vang Pao was at the head of some 30,000 troups.  This army and its air force were entirely funded by the United States to the tune of $300,000,000, administered and oerseen by the CIA.

Vnag Pao's original CIA case officer was William Young, the Baptist missionary-become-CIA-officer we met in the preceding chapter.  Young never had any problem with the opium trafficking of the Hmong tribes.  After Young was transferred out of the area in 1962, the CIA asked the Frenchman Trinquier to return as miliatary adviser to the Hmong.  Trinsented to rerform that function for a few months before the arrival of one of the most notorioius characters in this saga, an American named Anthony Posephny, always known as Tony Poe.

Poe was a CIA officer, a former US Marine who had been wounded at Iwo Jima.  By the early 1950's he was working for the Agency in Asia, starting with the training of

Tibetan Khamba tribesmen in Colorado leading them back to retrieve the Dalai Lama.  In 1958Poe showed up in Indonesia in an eaarly efort to topple Sukarno.  In 1960 he was training KMT forces for raids into China; his right hand was by now mangledafter ill-advised contact with a car's fanbelt.  In 1963 Poe became Van Pao's case officer and forthwith instituted new incentives to fire up the Hmong's dedication to freedom's cause, announcing that he would pay a cash bounty for every pair of Pathet Lao ears delivered to him.  He Kept a plastic bag on this front porch where the ears where deposited and strung his collection along the verandah.  To convince skeptical CIA superiors, in this case Ted Shackley in Vientiane, that this body counts were accurate, Poe once stapled a pair of ears to a report and sent it to HQ.

This souvenir of early methods of computing the slaughter of native Americans was not as foolproof as Poe imagined.  He himself later described goin up country and finding a small boy with no ears, then was told that the boy's father had sliced them off " to get money from the Americans."  Poe shifted his incentive to the entire heads of Pathet Lao, claiming that he preserved them in formaldehyde in his bedroom.

This man, described by an associate as an "amiable psychopath," was running Phoenix-type operationis into Lao villages near the Vietnam boarder.  The teams were officially termed "home defense units," though Poe more frankly described them as "hunter-killer teams."  Poe later claimed that he was booted out of Long Tieng because he had objected to CIA tolerance of Vang Pao

--------------------

Making Afghanistan Safe for Opium

The first indelible image of the war in Afghanistan for many Americans was probably that of CBS anchorman Dan Rather, wrapped in the voluminous drapery of a mujahedin fighter, lookin like a healthy relative of Lawrence of Arabia (albeit with hair that seemed freshly blow-dried, as some viewers were quick to point out).  From his secret mountainside "somewhere in the Hindu Kush"  Rather unloaded on his audience a barowload of nonsense about the conflict.  The Soviets, Rather confided portentiously, had put a bounty on his head " of many thousans of dollars."  He went on.  "It was the best compliment they could have given me.  And having a price put on my head was a small price to pay for the truths we told about Afghanistan."

Every one of these observations turned out to be entirely false.  Rather described the government of Hafizullah Amin as a "Moscow-installed puppet regime in Kabul."  But Amin had closer ties to the CIA than he did to the KGB.  Rather called the mujaheedin the "afghan freedom flighters ... who were engaged in a deeply patriotic fight to the death for home and hearth."  The mjahedin were scarcely fighting for freedom, in any sense Rather would have been comfortable with, but instead to impose one of the most repressive brands of Islamic fundamentalism known to the world, barbarous, ignorant and notably cruel to women.

It was a "fact," Rather anounced, that the soviets had used chemical weaponos against Afghan villagers.  This was a claim promoted by the number 3,042 Afghans had been killed by this yellow chemical rain, a substance that had won glorious propaganda victories in its manifestatioons in Laos a few years earlier, when the yellow rain turned out to be bee feces heavily loaded with pollen,  As Frank Brodhead put itin the London Guardian, "Its composition: one part bee feces, plus many parts State Department disinformationmixed with media gullibility."

Rather claimed that the mujahedin  were severely underequipped, doing their best with Kalashnikoov rifles taken from dead Soviet soldiers.  In fact the mujahedin were extremely well-e uipped, being the recipients of CIA furnished weapons in the most expensive covert war the Agency had ever mounted.  they did carry Soviet weapons, but they came courtesy of the CIA.  Rather also showed news footage that he claimed was of Soviet bombers strafing defenselss Afghan villages.  Theis footage was sttaged, with the "Soviet bomber" actually a Pakistani air force plane on a training mission over northwest pakistan

CBS claimed to have dicovered in Soviet bombed areas strffed animals filled with Soviet explosives, designed to blow Afghan children to bits.  These   booby-trapped toys   had in fact been manufactured by the mujahedin for the exclusive purpose of gulling CBS News, as an entertaining article in the New York Post later made clear.

Rather made his heroically filmed way to Yunas Khalis, described as the leader of the Afghan warriors.  In tones of awe he normally reserves the leader of the Afghan warriors.  In tones of awe he normally reserves for hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, Rather recalls in his book, The Camera Never Blinks Twice; "Belief in 'right' makes 'might' may have been fading in other parts of the world.  In Afghanistan it was alive and well, and beating the Soviets."  Khalis was a ruthless butcher, with his troops fondly boasting of their slaughter of 700 prisoners of war.  He spent most of his time fighting, but the wars were not primarily with the Soviets.  Instead, Khalis battled other Afghan rebel groups, the object of the conflicts being control of poppy fields and the roads and trails from them to his seven heroin labs near his headquarters in the town of Ribat al Ali.  Sixty percent of Afghanistan's opium crop was cultivated in the Helm; land Valley, with an irrigation infrastructure underwritten by USAID.

In his dispatches from the front Rather did mention the local opium trade,  but in a remarkably disingenuous fashion.  "Afghans,: he said, "had turned Darra into a boom town, selling their home grown opium for the best available weapons, then going back into Aghanistan to fight."

Darra is a town in northwest Pakistan where the CIA had seet up a facory to manufacture Soviet style weapons that it was giving away to all Afghan comers.  The weapons factory was run under contract to Pakistani Inter Service Intelligence (ISI).  Much of the opium trucked into Drra from Afghanistan bythe mujahedin was sold to the Pakistani governor of the northwest territory, Lieutenant General Fazle Huq.  From this opium the heroin was refined in labs in Darra, placed on Pakistani army trucks and transported to Karachi, then shipped to Europe and the United States.

Rather belittled the Carteer administration's reactions to the Soviet backed coup in 1979, charging that Carter's response had been tepid and slow in coming.  In fact, President Carterr had reacted with a range of moves that should have been the envy of the Reagan hawks who, a coupple of years later, were belaboring him for being a Cold War wimp.  Not onlydid Carter withdraw the United States form the 1980 Olympics, he slashed grain sales to the Soviet Union, to the great distress of Midwestern farmers; put the SALT II teaty hold; pledged to inncrease the US defense budget by 5 percent a year until the Soviets pulled out of Afghanistan; and unveiled the Carter doctrine of ontainment in southern Asia, which CIA historian John Ranelagh says led Carter to approve "more secret CIA operations that Reagan later did."

Carter later confessed in his memoirs that he was more shaken by the invasion of Afghanistan that any other event of his presidency, including the Iranian revolution.  Carter was convinced by the CIA that it could be the start of a push by the Soviets toward the Persian Gulf, a scenario that led the president to seriously consider the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

Three weeeks after Soviet tanks rolled into Kabul, Carter's secretary of defense, Harold Brown, was in Beijing, arrranging for a wapons transfer from the Chinese to the CIA backed Afghani troops mustered in Pakistan.  The Chinese,  who were generously compensated for the deal, a similar arrangement with Egypt to buy $15 million worth of weapons  "The US contacted me," Anwar Sadat recalled shortly before his assassination.  "They told me, 'Please open your stores for us so that we can give the Afghans the armaments they need to fight.;  And I gave them the armaments.  The transport of arms to the Afghans started from Cairo on US planes."

But few in the Carter administration believed the rebels had any chance of toppling the Soviets.  Under most scenarios, the war seemed destined to be a slaughter, with civilians and the rebels paying a heavy price.  The objective of the Carter doctrine was more cynical.  It was to bleed the Soviets, hoping to entrap them in a Vietnam style quagmire.  The high level of civilian casualties didn't faze the architects of covert american intervention.  "I decided I could live with that," recalled Carter''s CIA director Stansfield Turner.

Prior to the Soviet invasion, Afghanistan barely registered as a topic of interest for the national press, surfacing in only a handful of annual newspaper stories.  In December 19773, when detente was near its zenith, the Wall Street Journal ran a rare front page story on the country, titled"Do the Russians Covet Afghanistan? If so, It's Hard to Figure Why."  Reporter Peter Kann, later to become the Journal's chairman and publisher, wrote that "great powewr strategists tend to think of Afghanistan as a kind of fulcrum upon which the world balance of power tips.  But from close up, Afghanistan tends to look less ike a fulcrum or a domino or a stepping stone than like a vast expanse of desert waste with a few fly ridden bazaaars, a fair number of feuding tribes ad a lot of miserably poor people."

After the Soviet Union invaded, this wasteland swiftly acquired the status of a precious geopolitical prize.  A Journal editorial following the Soviet takeover said Afghanistan was "more serious than a mere stepping stone" and, in response, called for stationoing of US troops in the iddle East, increased military outlays, expanded covert operations and reinstatement of draft registration.  Drew Middleton,, then a New York times Defens Department correspondent, filed a tremulous postinvasion analysis in January 1980: "The conventional wisdom in the Pentagon." he wrote. "is that in purely military terms, the Russians are in a far better position vis-a-vis the United States than Hitler was against Britain and France in 1939."

The Pentagon and CIA agitprop machine went into high gear: on January 3,1980, George Wilson of the Washington Post reported thatmilitary leaders hoped the invasion would "help cure the Vietnam 'never again' hangover of the American public."  Newsweek said the "Soviet thrust" represented "a severe threat" to US interests: "Control of Afghanistan would put the Russians within 350 miles of the Arabian Sea, the oil lifeline could cut the lifeline at will."  The New York Times endorsed Carter's call for increased military spending and supported the Cruise and Trident missile programs, "faster research on the MX or some other mobile land missile," and the creation of a rapid deployment force for Thirld World intervention, calling the latter an "investment in diplomacy."

In sum, Afghanistan proved to be glorious campaign for both the CIA and Defense Department, a dazzling offensive in which waves of credulous and compliant journalists were dispatched to promulgate the ludicrous proposition that the United States was under military threat.  By the time Reagaan assumed office; he and his CIA director William Casey saw support for their own stepped up Afghan plan from an unlikely source, the Democrat-controlled Congress, which was pushing to double spending on the war.  "It was a windfall [for the Reagan administration]." a congressional staffer told the Washington ost.  "They'dfaced so much opposition to covert action in Central America; and here comes the Congress helping and throwing money atr them, putting money their way and they say, 'Who are we to say no?"

As the CIA increased its backing of the mujahedin (the DIA budget for Afghanistan finally reached $3,200,000,000, the most expensive unclassified secret operation in it's history) a White House member of the president's Strategic Council on Drug Abuse, David Musto, informed the administration that the decisiono to arm the mujahedin would misfire: "I told the Council that we were going into Afghanistan to support the opium growers in their rebellion against the Soviets.  Shouldn't we try to pay the growers if they will eradicate their opium production? There was silence."

After issuing this warning, Musto and a colleague on the council, Joyce Lowinson, continued to question US policy, but found their queries blocked by the CIA and the State Department.  Frustrated, they then turned to the New York Times oped page and wrote, on May 22, 1980:"We worry about the growing of opium in Afghanistan or Pakistan by rebel tribesmen who apparently are the chief adversaries of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan.  Are we erring in befriending these tribes as we did in Laos wen Air America (chartered by the CIA) helped transport crude opium from certain tribal areas?"  But Musto and Lowinson met with silence once again, not only from the administration but from the press.  It was heresy to question covert intervention in Afghanistan.

Later in 1980, Hoag Levins, a writer for philadelphia Magazine, interviewed a man he identified as a "high level" law enforcement official in the Carter administration's Justice Department and quoted him thus: "You have the administration tiptoeing around this like it's a land mine.  The issue of opium and heroin in Afghanistan is explosive ...  In the State of the Union speech, the presidennt mentioned drug abuse but he was very careful to avoid mentioning Afghanistan , even though Afghanistan is where things are reaally happening right now ...  Why are't we taking a more critical look at the arms we are now shipping into gangs of drug runners who are obviously going to use them to increase the efficiency of their drug smuggling operation.

The DEA was well aware that the mujahedin rebels were deeply involved in the opium trade.  The Drug agency's reports in 1980 showed positions were "determined in part by opium planting and harvest seasons."  the numberrs werestark and forbidding.  Afghan opium productioon tripled beween 1979 and 1982.  there was evidence that by 1981 the Afghan heroin producers had captured 60 percent of the heroin market in Western Europe and the United States (these are UN and DEA figures).

In 1971, during the height of the CIA's involvement in Laos, there were about 500,000 heroin addicts in the US.  By the mid to late 1970s this had fallen to 200,000.  but in 1981 with the new flood of Afghan heroin and consequent low prices, the heroin addict that the flow of arms to the mujahedin began), heroin related drug deaths increased by 77 perscent.  the only publicly acknowledged US casualties on the Afghan battlefields were some Black Musslims who journeyed to the Hindu Kush from the US to fight on the rophet's behalf.  But the drug casualties inside the US from the secret CIA war, particularly in the inner cities, numbered in the thousands, plus

 

 the untold social blight and suffering.

 

 

 

Since the seventeenth century opium  poppies have been grown in the so called Golden Cresecent, where the highlands of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran all converge.  For nearly four centuries this was an internal market.  By the 1950's very little opium was produced in either Afghanistan or Pakistan, with perhaps 2,500 acres in these two countries under cultivation.  The fertile growing fields of Afghanistan's Helm land Valley, by the 1980s under intensive opium  poppy cultivation, were covered with vineyards, wheat fields and cotton plantations.

In Iran, the situation was markedly different in the early 1950s.  The country, dominated by British and US oil companies and intelligence agencies, was producing 600 tons of opium a year and had 1,300,000 opium addicts, second only to China where, at the same moment, the western opium imperialists still held sway.  Then, in 1953, Mohammed Mossadegh, Iran's nationalist equivalent of China's Sun Yat sen, won elections and immediately moved to suppress the opium trade.  Within a few weeks, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was calling Mossadegh a madman, and Dulles'sbrother Allen, head of the CA, dispatched Kermit Roosevelt to organize a coup against him.  In August 1953 Mossadegh was overthrown, the Shah was installed by the CIA, and the oil and oium fields of Iran were once again in friendly hands.  Production continued unabated until the assumption of power in 1979 of Ayatollah Khomeini, at which point Iran had a very serious opium problem in terms of the addiction of its own population.  Unlike the mujahedin chieftains, the Ayatollah was a strict constructionist of Islamic law on the matter of intoxicants: addicts and dealers faced the deathpenalty.  Opium production in Iran dropped drastically.

In Afghanistan in the 1950s and 1960s, the relatively sparse opium trade was controlled by the royal family, headed by King Mohammed Zahir, the large feudal estates all had their opium fields, primarily to feed domestic consumption of the drug.  In April 1978 a populist coup overthrew the regime of Mohammed Daoud, who had formed an alliance with the Shah of Iran.  The Shah had shoveled money in Daoud's direction - $2,000,000,000 on one report - and the Iranian secret plice, the Savak, were imported to train Daoud's internal security force.  The new Afghan government was led by Noor Mohammed Taraki.  The Taraki administration moved toward land reform, hence an attack on the opium growing feudal estates.  Taraki went to the UN, where he requested and receeived loans for crop substitution for the poppy fields.

Taraki also pressed hard against opium production in the border areas held by fundamentalists, since the latter were using opium revenues to finance attacks on the Afghan central government, which they regarded as an unwholesome incarnation of modernity that allowed women to go to school and outlawed arranged marriages and the bride price.

By the spring of 1979 the character of Dan Rather's heroes, the mujahedin, was also beginning to emerge.  The Washington Post reported that the mujahedin liked to "torture their victims by first cutting off their noses, ears and genitals, then removing one slice of skin after another."  Over that year the mujahedin evinced particular animosity toward westerners, killing six West Germans and a Canadian tourist and severely beating a US military attache.  It's also ironic that in that year the mujahedin were getting money not only from the CIA but from Libya's Moammar Qaddaffi, sho sent $250,000 in their direction.

In the summer of 1979, over six months before the Soviets moved in, the US State Department produced a memorandum making clear how it swaw the stakes, no matter how moderrn minded Taraki might be, or how feudal the mujahedin: "The United States' larger interest ... would be served by the demise of the Taraki Amin regime, despite whatever setbacks this might mean for future social and economic reforms in Afghanistan."  The report continued, "The overthrow of the DRA(Democratic Republic of Afghanistan) would show the rest of the world, particularly the Third World, that the Soviets' view of the socialist course of history as being inevitable is not accurate."

Hard pressed by conservative forces in Afghanistan, Taraki appealed to the Soviets for help, which they declined to furnish on the grounds that this was exactly what their mutual enemies were waiting for.

In September 1979 Taraki was killed in a coup organizzed by Afghan military officers.  Hafizullah Amin was installed as president.  He had impeccable western credentials, having been to Columbia University in New York and the University of Wisconsin.  Amin had served as the president of the Afghan Students Association, which had been funded by the Asia Foundation, a CIA pass through group, or front.  After the coup Amid began meeting regularly with US Embassy officials at a time when the US was arming Islamic rebels in Pakistan.  Fearing a fundamentalist, US backed regime pressing against its own border, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in force on December 27, 1979.

Then began the Carter initiated CIA buildup that so worried White House drug expert David Musto.  In a replication of what happened following the CIA backed coup in Iran, the feudal estates were soon back in opium production and the crop-substitution program ended.

Because Pakistan had a nuclear program, the US had a foreign aid ban on the country.  This was soon lifted it as the waging of a proxy war in Afghanistan became prime policy.  In fairly short order, without any discernible slowdown iin its nuclear program, the US had a foreign aid ban on the country.  This was soon lifted it as the waging of a proxy war in Afghanistan became prime policy.  In fairly short order, without any discernible slowdown in its nuclear program, Pakistan became the third largest recipient of US aid worldwide, right behind Israel and Egypt.  Arms poured into Karachi from the US and were shipped up to Peshawar by the National Logistics Cell, a military unit controlled by Pakistan's secret police, the ISI.  From Peshawar those guns that weren't simply sold to any and all customers (the Iranians got 16 Stinger missiles, one of which was used against a US helicopter in the Gulf) were divvied out by the ISI to the afghan factions.

Though the US press, Dan Rather to the fore, portrayed the mujahedin as a unified force of freedom fighters, the fact (unsurprising to anyone with an inkling  of Afghan history) was that the mujahedin consisted of at least seven warring factions, all battling for territory and control of the opium trade.  The ISI gave the bulk of the arms - at one count 60 percent - to a particularly fanatical fundamentalist and woman hater Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who made his public debut at the Universityof Kabul by killing a leftist student.  In 1972 Hekmatyar fled to Pakistan, where he became an agent of the ISI.  He urged his followers to throw acid in te faces of women not wearing the veil, kidnapped rival leaders, and built up his CIA furnished arsenal against the day the Soviets would leave and the war for the mastery of Afghanistan would truly break out.

Using his weapons to get control of the opium fields, Hekmatyar and his men would urge the peasants, at gun point, to increase production.  They would collect the raw opium and bring it back to Hekmatyar's six heroin factories in the town of Koh i Soltan.  One of Hekmatyar's chief rivals in the mujahedin, Mullah Nassim, controlled the opium poppy fields in the Richard Helms land Valley, producing 260 tons of opium a year.  His brother, Mohammed Rasul, defended this  brother, Mohammed Rasul, defended this agricultural enterprise by sting, "We must grow and sell opium to fight our holy war against the Rusian nonbelievers."  Despite this well calculated pronouncement, they spent almost all their time fighting their fellow believers, using the weapons sent them by the CIA to try to win the advantage in theseinternecine struggles.  In1989 Hekmatyar launched an assault against Nassim, attempting to take control of the Helmland Valley.  Nassim fought him off, but a few months later Hekmatyar successfully engineered Nassim's assassination when he was holding the post of deputy defense minister in the provisional post Soviet Afghan government.  Hekmatyar now controlled opium growing in the Helmland Valley.

American DEA agents were fully apprised of the drug running of the mujahedin in concert with Pakistani intelligence and military leaders.  In 1983 the DEA's congressional liaison, David Melocik, told a congressional committee, "You can say the rebels make their money off the sale of opium.  There's no doubt about it.  These rebels keep their cause going through the sale of opium."  But talk about "the cause" depending on drug sales was nonsense at that particular moment.  The CIA was paying for everything regardless.  The opium revenues were ending up in offshore accounts in the Habib Bank, one of Pakistan's largest, and in the accounts of BCCI, founded by Agha Hasan Abedi, who began his banking career at Habib.  The CIA was simultaneously using BCCIfor its own secret transactions.

The DEA had evidence of over forty heroin syndicates operating in Pakistan in the mid-1980s during the Afghan war, and there was evidence of more than 200 heroin labs operating in northwest Pakistan.  Even though Islamabad houses one of the largest DEA offices in Asia, no action was ever taken by the DEA agents against any of these operations.  An Interpol officer told the journalist Lawrence Lifschultz, "IT is very strange that the Americans, with the size of their resources, and political power they possess in Pakistan, have failed to break a single case.  The explanation cannot be found in a lack of adequate police work.  They have had some excellent men working inn Pakistan."  But working in the same offices aas those DEA agents were five CIA officers who, so one of the DEA agents later told the Washington Post, ordered them to pull back their operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan fr the duration of the war.

Those DEA agents were well aware of the drug tainted profile of a firm the CIA was using to funnel cash to the mujahedin, namely Shakarchi Trading Company.  This Lebanese owned company had been the subject ofa long running DEA investigation into money laundering.  One of Shakarchi's chief clients was Yasir Musullulu, who had once been nabbed attempting to deliver an 8.5 ton shipment of Afghan opium to members of the Gambino crime syndicate in NewYork City.  A DEA memo noted that Shakarchi mingled "the currency of heroin, morphinebase, and hashish traffickers with that of jewelers buying gold on the black market and Middle Eastern arms traffickers."

In May 1984 Vice President George Bush journeyed to Pakistan to confer with General Zia al Huq and other ranking members of the Pakistaniregime.  At the time, Bush was the head of President Reagan's Natioinal Narcotics Border Interdiction System.  n this latter function, one of Bush's first moves was to expand the role of the CIA in drug operations.  He gave the Agency primary responsibility in the use of, and control over, drug informants.  The operational headof this task force was retired Admiral Daniel J. Murphy.  Murphy pushed for access to intelligence on drug syndicates but complained that the CIA was frever dragging its feet.  "I didn'tt win," he said later to the NEW York Times.  "I didn't get as much effective participation from the CIA as I wanted."  Another member of the task force put it more bluntly, "The CIA could be of value, but you need a change of values and attitude.  I don't know of a single thing they've ever given us that was useful."

Bush certainly knew well that Pakistan had become the source for most of the high grade heroin entering Western Europe and the US and that the generals with whom he was consorting were deeply involved in the drug trade.  But vice presient Bush, who proclaimed later that "I will never bargain with dru dealers on US or foreign soil," used his journey to Pakistan to praise the Zia regime for its unflinching support for the War on Drugs.  (Amid such rhetorical excursions he did find time, it has to be said, to extract from Zia a contract to buy $40,000,000 worth of gas turbines made by the General Electric Co.)

Predictably, through the 1980s the Reagan and bush administrations went to great lengths to pin the blame for the upswing in Pakistani heroin production on the Soviet generals in Kabul.  "The regime maintains an absolute indifference to any measures to control poppy," Reagan's attorney general Edwin Meese declared during a visit to Islamabad in March 1986.  "We strongly believe that there is actually encouragement, at least tacitly, over growing opium poppy."

Meese knew better.  His own Justice Department had ben tracking the import of drugs from akistan since at least 1982 and was well aware that the trade was controlled by Afghan rebels and the Pakistani military.  A few months after Meese's speech in Pakistan, the US Customs Office nabbed a Pakistani man named Abdul Wali as he tried to unload more than a ton of hash and a smaller amount of heroin into the US at Port Newark, New Jersey.  The Justice Department informed the press that Wali headed a 50,000 member organization in northwest Pakistan, but Deputy Attorney General Caudia Flynn refused to reveal the group's identity.  Another federal official told the Associated Press that Wali was a top leader of the mujahedin.

It was also known to US officials that people on intimate terms with President Zia were making fortunes in the opium trade.  The word "fortune" here is no exaggeration, since one such Zia associate had $3,000,000,000 in  his BCCI accounts.  In 1983,  a year before George Bysh's visit to Pakistan, one of President Zia's doctors, a Japanse herbalist named Hisayoshi Maruyama was arrested in Amsterdam packing 17.5 kilos of high grade heroin manufactured in Pakistan out of Afghan opium.  At the thime of his arrest he was disguised as a boy scout.

Interrogated by DEA agents after his arrest, Maruyama said that he was just a courier for Mitza Iqbal Baig, a man whom Pakistani customs agents described as "the most active dope deealer in the county."  Baig was on close terms with the Zia family and  other ranking officials in the government.  He had twice been a target of the DEA, whose agents were told not to pusue Investigations of him because of his ties to the Zia government.  A top Pakistani lawyer, Said Sani Ahmed, told the BBC that this was standard procedure in Pakistan: "We may have evidence against a paprticular indiidual, but still our law enforcing agencies cannot lay hands on such people, because they are forbidden to act by their superiors.  The real culprits have enough money and resources.  Frankly, they are enoying some sort of immunity."

Baig was one of the tycoons of the Pakistani city of Lahore, owning cinemas, shopping centers, factories and a textile mill.  He wasn't indicted on drug charges until 1992, after the fall of the Zia regime, wgeb a US federal court in Brooklyn indicted him for heroin trafficking.  The US finally exerted enough pressure on Pakistan to have him arrested in 1993; as of the spring of 1998 he was in prison in Pakistan.

One of Baig's partners (as described in Newsweek) in his drug business was Haji Ayub Afridi, a close ally of President Zia, who had served in the Pakistani General Assembly.  Afridi lives thirty five miles outside Peshawar in a large compound sealed off by 20 foot high walls topped with concertina wire and with defenses including an anti aircraft battery and a private army of tribesmen.  Afridi was sais to be in charge of purchasing raw opium from the Afghan drug lords, while Baig looked after logistics and shipping to Europe and the US.  IN 1993, Afridi was alleged to have put out a contact on the life of a DEA agent working in Pakistan.

Another case close to the Zia government involved the arrest on drug charge of Hamid Hasnain, the vice president of Pakistan's larest financial house, the Habib Bank.  Hasnain's arrest became the centerpiece of a scandal known as the "Pakistani League affair."  The drug ring was investigated by a dogged Norwegian investigator named Olyvind Olsen.  On December 13, 1983 Norwegian police seized 3.5 kilos of heroin at Oslo airport in the luggage of a Pakistani named Raza Qureishi.  In exchange for a reduced sentence Qureishi agreed to name his suppliers to Olsen,  the narcotics investigator.  Shortly after his interview with Qureishi, Olsen flew to Islamabad to ferret out the other members of the heroin syndicate.  For more than a year Olsen pressured Pakistan's Federal Investigate Agency (FIA) to arrest the three men Qureishi had fingered: Tahir Butt, Munawaar Hussain, and Hasnain.  All were associates of Baig and Zia.  It wasn't until Olsen threatened to publicly condemn the FIA's conduct that the Agency took any action: finally, on October25,1985 the FIA arrested the three men.  When the Pakistani agents picked up Hasnain they were assailed with a barrage of threats.  Hasnain spoke of "dire consequences" and claimed to be "like a son" to President Za.  Inside Hasnain's suitcase FIA agents discovered records of the ample bank accounts of President Aia plus those of Zia's wife and daughter.

Immediately after learning of Hasnain's arrest, Zia's wife, who was in Egypt at the time, telephoned the head of the FIA.  The president's wife imperiously demanded the release of her family's "personal banker."  It turned out that Hasnain not only attended to the secret financial affairs of the presidential family, but also of the senior Pakistani generals, who were skimming money off the arms imports from the CIA and making millions from the opium traffic.  A few days after his wife's call, President Zia himself was on the phone to the FIA, demanding that the investigators explain the circumstances surrounding Hasnain's arrest.  Zia soon arranged for Hasnain to be released on bail pending trial.  When Qureishi, the courier, took the stand to testify against Hasain, the banker and his co defendant hurled death threats against the witness in  open court, prompting a protest from the Norwegian investigator, who threatened to withdraw from the proceedings.

Eventually the judge in the case clamped down, revoking Hasnain's bail and handing him a stiff prison term after his conviction.  But Hasnain was just a relatively small fish who went to prison while guilty generals went free.  "He's been made a scapegoat," Munir Bhatti told journalist Lawrence Lifschultz, "The CIA apoiled the case.  The evidence was distorted.  There was no justification in letting off the actual culprits who include senior personalities in this country.  There was eveidence in this case identifying such people."

Such were the men to whom the CIA was paying $3,200,000,000 to run the Afghan war, and no person btter epitomizes this relationship than Lieutenant General Fazle Huq, who oversaw military operations in northwest Pakistan fr General Zia, including the arming of the mujahedin who were using the region as a staging area for their raids.  It was arms shipments, and it was also Huq who oversaw and protected the operations of the 200 heroin labs within his jurisdiction.  Huq had been identified in 1982 by interpol as a key player in the Afghan-Pakistani opium trade.  The Pakistani opposition leaders referred to Huq as Pakistan's Noriega.  He had been protected from drug investigations by Zia and the CIA and laer boasted that with these connections he could get away "with blue murder."

Like other narco generals in the Zia regime, Huq was also on close terms with Agha Hassan Abedi, the head of the BCCI.  Abedi, Huq and Zia would dine together nearly every month, and conferred several count worth $3,000,000.  After Zia was assassinated in 1988 by a bomb planted (probably by senior military officers) in his presidential plane, Huq lost some of his official protection, and he was soon arrested for ordering the murder of a Shi' ite cleric.

After Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was deposed, her replacement Ishaq Khan swiftly releassed Huq from prison.  In 1991 Huq was shot to death, probaably in revenge for the cleric's death.  The opium general was given a state funeral, where he was eulogized by Ishaq Khan as "a great soldier and competent administrator who played a commendable role in Pakistan's national progress."

Benazir Bhutto had swept to power in 1988 amid fierce vows to clean up Pakistan's drug sodden corruption, but it wasn't long before her own regime became the focus of serious charges.  In 1989 the US DEA came across information that Benazir's husband, Asif Ali Zardari, may have been financing large shipments of heroin from Pakistan to Great Britain and the US.  The DEA assigned one of its agents, a man named John Banks, to work undercover in Pakistan.  Banks was a former British mercenary who had worked undercover for Scotland Yard in big internal drug cases.

While in Pakistan, Banks claims he posed as a member of the Mafia and that he had me with Bhutto and her husband at their home in Sind.  Banks further claims tat he traveled with Zadari to Islamabad, where he secretly recorded five hours of conversation b eween Zadari, a Pakistani air force general and a Pakistani banker.  The men discussed the logistics of transprting heroin to the US and to Britain:  "We talked about how they were going to ship the drugs to America in a metal cutter," Banks said in 1996.  "They told me that the United Kingdm was another area where they had shipped heroin and hashish on a regular basis."  The British Customs Office has also been monitoring Zadari for dope urnning:  "We received intelligece from about three or four sources, about his alleged involvement as a financier," a retired British customs officer told the Financial Times.  "This was all reported to British intelligence."  The customs official says his government failed to act on this report.  Similarly, Banks asserts that the CIA halted the DEA's investigation of Zardari.  All this emerged when Bhutto's government fell for the second time, in 1996, on charges of corruption lodged primarily against Zardari, who is now in prison for his role in the murder of his brother in law Murtaza.  Zardari also stands accused of embezzling more than a $1,000,000,000,000 in government funds.

In 1991 Nawz Sharif says that while he served as prime minister he was approached by two Pakistani generals, Aslam Beg, chief of staff for the army=, and Asad Durrani, head of the ISI - with a plan to fund dozens of covert operations through the sale of heroin.  "General Durrani told me, 'We have a blueprint ready for your approval,' Sharif explained to Washington Post reporter John Ward Anderson in 1994.  "I was totally flabbergasted.  Boh Beg and Durrani insisted that Pakistan's name would not be cited at any place because the whole operation would be carried out by trustworthy third parties.  Durrani then went on to list a series of covert military operations in deperate need of money."  Sharif said that he rejected the plan, but believes it was put in place when Bhutto resumed power.

The impact of the Afghan war on Pakistan's addiction rates was even more drastic than the surge in heroin addiction in US and Europe.  Before the CIA program began, there were fewer than 5,000 heroin addicts in Pakistan.  By 1996, according to the UN, there were more then 1,600,000.  The Pakistani representative to the UN Commission on Narcotics, Raoolf Ali Khan, said in 1993 that "there is no brandch of government where drug  corruption doen's pervade."  As an example he pointed to the fact that Pakistan spendsonly $1,800,000 a year on anti drug efforts, with an allotment of $1,000 to puchase gasoline for its seven trucks.

By 1994 the value of the heroin trade in Pakistan was twice the aount of the government's budget.  A Western diplomat told the Washington Post in that year that when you get to the stage where narco traffickers have more money than the government, it's going to take remarkable efforts and remarkable peope to turn it around."  The magnitude of commitment required is illustrated by two episodes.  In 1991 the largest drug bust in world hisory occurred on the road from peshawar to Karachi.  Pakistani customs officers seized 3.5 tons of heroin and 44 tons of hashish.  Several days later half the hashish and heroin had vanished along with the witnesses.  The suspects, four men with ties to Pakistani intelligence, had "mysteriously escaped," to use the words of a Pakistani cusoms officer.  In1993 Pakistani borderguards seized 8 tons of hashish and 1.7 tons of heroin.   When the case was turned over to the Pakistani narcotics control board, the entire staff went on vacation to avoid being involved in the investigation.  No one was discilined or otherwise inconvenienced and the narco traffickers got off scot free.  Even the CIA was eventually forced to admit in a 1994 report to Congress that heroin had become the "life blood of the Pakistani economy and political system."

In February 1989 Mikhail Gorbachev pulled the Soviet troops out of Aghanistan, and asked the US to agree to an embargo on the provision of weapons to any of the Afghan mujahedin factions, who were preparing for another phase of internecine war for control of the country.  President Bush refused, thus ensuring a period of continued misery and horror for most Afghans.  The war hd already turned haf the population into refugees, and seen 3,000,000 woulded and more than a million killed.  The proclivities of the mujahedin at this point are illustrated by a couple of anecdotes.  The Kabul correspondent of the far Eastern Economic Review reported in 1989 the mujahedin's treatment of Soviet prisoners: "One group was killed, skinned and hung up in a butcher's shop.  One captive found himself the center of attraction in a game of buzkashi,that rough and tumble form of Afghan polo in which a headless goat is usually th ball.  The captive was used instead.  Alive.  He was literally torn to pieces."  The CIA also had evidence that its freedom fighters had doped up more than 200 Soviet soldiers with heroin and locked them in animal cages where, the Washington Post reported in 1990, they led "lives of indescibable horror."

In September 1996 the Taliban, fundamentalist nurtured originally in Pakistan as creatures of both the ISI and the CIA, seized power in Kabul, wherupon Mullah Omar, their leader, announced that all laws inconsistent with the Muslim Sharia would be changed.  Women would be forced to assume the chador and remain at home =, with total segregation of the sexes and women kept out of hospitals, schools and public bathrooms.  The CIA continued to support these medieval fanatics who, according to Emma Bonino, the European Union's commissioner for humanitarian affairs, were committing "gender genocide."

One law at odds with the Sharia that the Taliban had no apparent interest in changing was the prophet's injunction against intoxicans.  In fact, the Taliban urged its Afghan farmers to increase their production of opium.  One of the Taliban leaders, the "drug czar" Abdul Rashid, noted, "If we try to stop this (opium farming) the people will be against us."  By the end of 1996 according to the UN, Afghan opium production had reached 2,000 metric tons.  There were an estimated 200,000 families in Afghanistan working in the opium trade.  The Taliban were in control of the 96 percent of all Afghan land in opium cultivation and imposed a tax on opium production and a  road toll on trucks carrying the crop.

In 1997 an Afghan opium armer gave ironic repl  to Jimmy Carter's brooding on whether to use nuclear weapons as part of a response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.  Amhud Gul told a reporter from the Washington Post, "We are cutivating this(that is, opium) and exporting this as an atom bomb."  CIA intervention had worked its magic once again.  By 1994, Afghanistan, according to the UN drug conrol program had surpassed Burma as the world's number one supplier of raw opium.

 

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(from ISBN 0385513925)

During his time ased in Sudan, from 1991 to 1996, Osama bin Laden employed accounts at Khartoum's al-Shamal Islamic Bank to access the world banking system.  Although established only in 1984, not to mention located in a county considered at the time to be a dusty backwater, al-Shamal was a local correspondent for Credit Lyonnais, Commerzbank, Barclays, and a Saudi affiliate of ABN AMRO.

 

It was this way, for instance, that in 1993, bin Laden's Sudanese construction interests wired $179,955 to a Dallas branch of Bank of America to fund the purchase of an aircraft tha al qaeda would later use to transport Stinger missiles from Pakistan to Sudan.  In the aftermath of 9/11/2001, al qaeda interests were found to enjoy banking facilities in Sudan, Yemen, Cyprus, Germany, Hong King, South Africa, and the United Kingdom.  Layers and Fronts are usually required in the global money laundering game.